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The public vocational education and training (VET) system is now one of the few areas 
in Australia’s tertiary education system where students are required to pay up-front fees 
without access to loan assistance. These arrangements may lead to sub-optimal 
educational outcomes to the extent that prospective students reject a VET education on 
the basis of short-term financial constraints. In this paper we analyse some of the 
important issues related to the adoption of FEE-HELP (a 2005 Federal Government 
financial instrument based on the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS)). It is 
argued that income contingent loans of this kind are associated with the advantages of 
both default-protection and consumption smoothing. Using data from the first three 
waves of the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey, we 
examine various empirical issues associated with the adoption of FEE-HELP in VET, 
including the extent of private salary returns to VET qualifications. As well, we explore 
issues related to the public subsidies inherent in the adoption of FEE-HELP in VET, and 
illustrate the time periods involved in loan repayments for various assumptions 
concerning the size of the charge and the future income of VET graduates. 
Administrative issues are considered, as are the implications for the Commonwealth 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The 2007/2008 Federal Budget announced the extension of the FEE-HELP income contingent 
loan system to those parts of the vocational education and training 
Australia’s public vocational education and training (VET) system now sits in what is arguably 
a strange place amongst the nation’s post compulsory education providers. Since the 
introduction of FEE-HELP in 2005, and its subsequent extension to an increasing number of 
eligible private higher education providers, the public VET system is now one of a few areas of 
tertiary education in which many students are required to pay up-front fees without access to any 
form of loan assistance. 
The economic case for an income contingent loan for the VET sector is as familiar as is this case 
for higher education, where such loans have been available since 1989. This takes the form of 
Commonwealth supported university courses under the guise of the Higher Education 
Contribution Scheme (now known as HECS-HELP), and since 2005, via FEE-HELP for 
non-Commonwealth funded courses at universities and eligible private higher education 
providers. Some might argue that the distinction in financing arrangements between VET and 
higher education seems somewhat arbitrary given the breadth of courses eligible for FEE-HELP. 
The central issue is that up-front fees, without the provision of an income contingent loan, sit 
uneasily with economic theory. 
In this paper we evaluate VET in terms of returns to human capital investments, and assess the 
implications for this investment of introducing a HECS-style income contingent loan. To 
anticipate our results, we find significant private returns to the acquisition of higher level VET 
qualifications. This suggests that there is a potential to have contributions from students through 
HECS-type arrangements. Further, introducing a HECS-style income contingent loan into the 
VET sector would be administratively straightforward to implement given that the infrastructure 
is largely already in place. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a broad overview of 
current course fees in Australia’s public VET system. Section 3 establishes the theoretical case 
for income contingent loans while section 4 reviews Australia’s experience with HECS. Section 3 
 
5 introduces the concept of the internal rate of return to estimate the benefits of VET education, 
and section 6 analyses the impact of introducing an income contingent loan into the VET sector. 
In section 7 we consider how an income contingent loan might be extended to the VET sector in 
practical terms, and section 8 concludes. 
2.  CHANGES IN VET FEES AND THE INCIDENCE OF CONCESSIONS AND 
EXEMPTIONS 
In this section we consider recent developments in course fees for VET education, and the 
prevalence of concessions and exemptions, in order to frame the debate. To the extent that 
course costs are significant, then up-front fees may prohibit participation in the VET sector. 
Given the range of courses available under the VET banner, we consider a selection of 
Technical and Further Education (TAFE) courses to proxy developments in public sector VET 
courses more generally. 
With increased emphasis on the economic goals, and benefits, of tertiary education, have come 
increases in tuition fees charged by TAFE institutes. In  2003 the maximum TAFE fees for 
diploma programmes funded by governments ranged from $500 in Victoria to $1,200 in South 
Australia (Watson 2003). In 2005 the maximum fees for government funded programmes 
ranged from $900 in Tasmania to $1,224 in NSW. Restrictions on places funded by the 
government and the high cost of qualified teachers, facilities, equipment or materials in some 
areas have led several institutes to offer ‘fee for service’ or full fee-paying programmes. Many 
of these are in the ‘new economy’ areas where growth is fastest but the capacity to expand is 
lowest. 
Thus Brisbane’s Southbank Institute offers its Diploma of Multimedia for full fees (full rate 
$6,060, concession rate $5,362) because of the very high equipment and teaching costs of the 
programme. Perth’s Central TAFE charges a tuition fee of $4,000 for its Diploma of 
Aromatherapy of 480 hours, which is somewhat less than full time for one year. For its 
Certificate IV in assessment and workplace training, Melbourne’s Holmesglen Institute of 
TAFE charges $800 for 210 student contact hours, or about $1,900 for a full-time load. Adelaide 
Institute of TAFE’s Certificate III in hospitality (commercial cookery), charges high fees 
($3,167 for 6 months) because of the high cost of materials for the programme. 4 
 
There are no data on the extent of full fee paying programmes offered by TAFE institutes, but 
State officials believe they are growing (Watson 2003). Student fees and charges were $197.7 
million or 4.3 per cent of all Australian TAFE revenue in 2003 (NCVER 2004). All States and 
Territories offer fee concessions or exemptions to members of particular demographic groups. 
TAFE generally does not charge fees for adult literacy and labour market programmes and some 
jurisdictions give concessions to apprentices or trainees. However, simplifying, the States and 
Territories give fee exemptions and concessions to three main groups: Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islanders (ATSI), recipients of AUSTUDY and the youth allowance — student 
(AUSTUDY), and recipients of Commonwealth income support (pensioners). NSW and the 
Northern Territory exempt all members from these groups from TAFE tuition fees. Victoria 
charges Indigenous Australians and recipients of Commonwealth income support a single tuition 
fee of $50, and charges recipients of income support for students 50 per cent of the standard fee. 
The other jurisdictions charge a proportion of the standard fee ranging from 25  per  cent 
(Queensland) to 53  per  cent (Western  Australia), and some jurisdictions also have caps, 
typically of $250 to $440 for a full year’s study load. In addition, all jurisdictions give institute 
directors the discretion to waive fees for students who are considered to suffer extreme hardship. 
These arrangements are summarised in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: State and Territory TAFE tuition fee exemptions and concessions for Diploma 
and above students 
State ATSI  AUSTUDY  Pensioners 
NSW  Free Free Free 
Victoria  $50  50% of standard fee  $50 
Queensland  25% of standard fee  25% of standard fee  25% of standard fee 
Western Australia  53% of standard fee  53% of standard fee  53% of standard fee 
South Australia  50% of standard fee  50% of standard fee  50% of standard fee 
Tasmania  33% of standard fee  33% of standard fee  33% of standard fee 
Northern  Territory  Free Free Free 
ACT  50% of standard fee  50% of standard fee  50% of standard fee 
Source: Watson 2003 5 
 
3.  THE PROBLEMS WITH UP-FRONT FEES FOR VET 
3.1  Income contingent repayment and the failure of capital markets 
The first economic problem associated with charging up-front fees for VET is that for those who 
cannot afford to pay, there is only an ineffective capital market available from which to borrow. 
The concern of a bank lending for human capital investments is that, unlike many other 
purchases from a prospective debtor, there is no saleable collateral in the event of default — 
such as would be the case for the housing capital market — and there is no slavery market in 
which to sell the human capital being developed. 
The other problem for banks lending to students relates to collection costs in the event of 
default, an issue which assumes significant importance given the absence of collateral. The 
governments of many countries address these problems by acting as a guarantor for student 
loans, and by paying the interest for the period before graduation. The problem inherent in this 
approach is that because the loans are government guaranteed, high default rates imply 
additional government subsidies, which can be very high. In the US, for example, the associated 
costs of uncollected debt are particularly significant for those borrowing to finance vocational 
training. 
Further, loans are usually only made available to people from poor families, or those who can 
establish independence through satisfying a complex set of conditions related to age and/or work 
experience. This suggests that some prospective students who need financial assistance because 
their families do not provide help will be unable to access the system. That is, the financial 
barrier will not be completely removed through means testing allowing concessions or free 
entry, because when this is conditional on family income, as is the current VET policy, such an 
approach presupposes that parents or partners are actually willing and able to share resources. If 
that assumption does not hold, the use of family income to determine support is a flawed 
criterion and means that some prospective students will be excluded even if their family income 
is relatively high. In essence, the idea of means tested loan arrangements based on family 
income relies on the assumption of willingness to help within the family, and can thus fail 
because of it. 
The central point about access is that the high cost of participating in VET (both through direct 
living costs and foregone income), combined with a lack of family and capital market sources of 
finance, potentially creates a significant barrier for many students which is necessarily 6 
 
exacerbated through the imposition of up-front fees. However, schemes such as HECS, and 
other feasible income contingent repayment arrangements, are likely to considerably diminish 
these problems because they reduce the importance of the financial situation of the prospective 
student's family. 
3.2  Income contingent repayment and default protection 
Given the financing problem recognised above for VET, some policy commentators might be 
tempted to suggest the traditional solution of a loans system made available through the private 
banks with a government guarantee. However, making repayments conditional on future income 
has a special advantage over other typical debt repayment schemes, a point now explored. 
One advantage of an income contingent repayment approach is that it avoids the basic problem 
of the usual type of loan offered by banks, known as a ‘mortgage style’ loan. This type of loan 
arrangement requires repayments to be made over a specified period of time, for example, the 
term of a mortgage. Usually no weight is given to the consequences of low income because debt 
obligations have to be met within a given period of time. 
The essential difference between income contingent and mortgage types of loans is that the 
income contingent variety serves to protect prospective students from the costs of the exigencies 
associated with the returns to educational investments. What HECS, for example, offers is a 
form of ‘default insurance’, such that former students do not have to bear the costs of reneging 
on their debt as a result of periods of low future income. This is quite different to a 
mortgage-style loan, in which the costs of defaulting exist and may be very high in terms of 
being locked out of other capital markets (most notably for housing) through damage to a 
person’s credit reputation. 
Default protection from income contingent repayment overcomes the fundamental problem for 
prospective borrowers inherent in other loan schemes. With income contingent approaches there 
is unlikely to be any concern about prospective students being unable to repay a loan or making 
repayment under financial duress. 
It is important to emphasise that some aversion to borrowing for human capital investment is 
perfectly understandable. After all, the returns to such investments have a very high variance — 
many students enrolled in VET do not complete their courses, and the income differences 
between VET graduates can be significant. The critical point is that when the repayment 7 
 
arrangements are sensitive to the personal income of the VET graduate, the default issue related 
to borrowing essentially disappears. 
3.3  Income contingent repayment and consumption smoothing 
A related problem for students with bank loans concerns possible consumption difficulties 
associated with fixed repayments. If the expected path of future incomes is variable, a fixed 
level of a debt payment increases the variance of disposable (after debt repayment) incomes. 
The point can be illustrated with the following simple example, with much more detail being 
available in Chapman (2006). 
Imagine that a student incurs a debt with a constant monthly level of repayments of $500 after 
graduation, say, for 5 years. If her monthly income is expected to be a constant amount of 
$5,000 after-tax, then the debt is also a constant proportion of income, in this case 10 per cent. It 
is more likely to be the case that she expects her income to increase over time, as a result of 
promotions for example, implying that the bank repayment would be expected to fall as a 
proportion of disposable income. In these cases the bank loan should not be expected to 
significantly affect her welfare. 
But in the event of misfortune, such as job loss, or sickness, the former student’s income stream 
might be far less stable than for the above circumstances. For example, imagine that the student 
gives a positive probability to a monthly after-tax income stream of $5,000 for the first year, but 
only $1,500 for the second year. In this case, her ex post loan obligations turn out to be 
10 per cent  of  income  initially, but then reach 33.3  per  cent of income. The fixed loan 
repayment obligation is then associated with the likelihood of significant consumption 
hardships. Moreover, the possibility has a greater potential to discourage loan take-up from 
those expecting to not have access to alternative finances to help in the event of low future 
incomes, and these are more likely to be members of relatively disadvantaged groups. 
In summary, income contingent loans offer the prospect of a solution to the financial market 
problems inherent in charging for VET. In contrast, the up-front fee regimes currently in place 
in the public VET sector can be argued to be a less favourable arrangement, for both economic 
and social reasons. 8 
 
4.  AUSTRALIA’S EXPERIENCE WITH HECS
1 
In 1989 the Australian Federal Government re-introduced charges for undergraduate university 
students, with a (then) unique financing instrument, an income contingent loan. The system was 
known as the Higher Education Contribution Scheme and it allowed students to postpone the 
payment of the charge until their future incomes exceeded a given threshold, at that time equal 
to the average income of all Australians working for pay. The charge was a flat rate of $1,800 
per full time unit of study per year (in 1989 dollars). Those choosing to pay up-front were given 
a discount of 15 per cent, but after the debt is incurred the rate of interest was (and remains) 
equal only to the rate of price inflation.
2 
At the time of the introduction of HECS close to nothing was known about the effects of income 
contingent loans, because the scheme was the first of its kind. There are several areas of interest 
in an assessment of the empirical consequences of HECS. They concern the effects of HECS on 
the private benefits to higher education and the consequent demand for admission, and the 
access of the poor to the university system. 
4.1  Studies of aggregate demand for university places 
Two approaches have been adopted to assess the impact of HECS on student demand. One has 
been to estimate its impact on the private returns to investment in higher education. The second 
has been to explore whether higher education participation changed after either the introduction 
of HECS or the 1997 variations to its operation. 
Chapman and Ryan (2005) adopt the first approach. They analysed whether the introduction of 
student charges through HECS in 1989, and the major changes to the system in 1997,
3 had 
significant impacts on the net economic benefits to graduates from a university education. The 
approach involves examination of private internal rates of return to higher education, a 
calculation requiring the construction of income profiles for hypothetical individuals, based on 
data from representative individuals. 
                                              
1   Some of the analysis of this section follows discussion in Chapman (2006). 
2   The discount for up-front payment was increased to 20 per cent, but has since been reduced to 10 per cent. 
3    In 1997 differential charges by course were introduced, the first income threshold of repayment was 
decreased considerably and the average charge was increased substantially. See Chapman and Salvage 
(1997). 9 
 
The internal rates of return estimates before and after the introduction of HECS, and following 
the 1997 changes are shown in Table 2 (taken from Chapman and Ryan 2002). 
Table 2: Real internal rates of return to higher education for males and females: various 
HECS scenarios (per cent per annum, after tax) 
 
Men Women 
1988 (NO HECS)   14.6  13.9 
1989–90 14.1  13.8 
1997–98 13.1  12.6 
Source: Chapman and Ryan 2002 
 
There are several points of significance from the table. First, before HECS (in 1988), real rates 
of return to both men and women, of 14.6 and 13.9 per cent per annum, were very high. Second, 
both the introduction of HECS, and the substantial changes in both the level of the HECS charge 
and the parameters of the repayment rules introduced in 1997, were not associated with major 
changes to internal rates of return. Chapman and Ryan (2005) conclude that Australian 
university graduates on average have done very well in the labour market, and HECS has had 
little impact on these private benefits. 
Borland (2001) also estimated rates of return based on income profiles, but from a different 
ABS data source. In Borland’s results there was a 1.5 percentage point difference in the returns 
for a representative male who repaid his post-1996 HECS Band 2 course debt after entering the 
labour market, compared to a no-HECS regime. This is the same as in Chapman and Ryan 
(2002) and reported in Table 2 between the pre-HECS 1988 rate of return and the post-1996 
return. 
If HECS has not affected the return on the investment in a substantial way, it would seem 
reasonable to expect little change in the aggregate demand for higher education. This is not as 
straightforward as it seems since the issue requires some background commentary on the 
different potential meaning of the notion of ‘aggregate demand’. 
An important point involves the distinction between applications and enrolments. That is, a 
potential senior high school student’s interest in pursuing higher education begins with her 
making an application for a place. If a place is offered her next decision concerns whether or not 
to accept and to thus enrol. The distinction between applications and enrolments is not very 
interesting if there is an excess supply of places, but this has not been the case in Australia over 
the last several decades. Indeed, HECS was motivated in part by the perceived need to diminish 10 
 
the number of ‘qualified’ students unable to access higher education due to the shortage of 
places. 
There have been several empirical exercises exploring the effects of HECS on applications. The 
first, from Andrews (1997), used a multiple regression approach attempting to explain changes 
in the ratio of applicants from Year 12 to the total number of Year 12 students. He included 
measures of youth job opportunities, and allowed the effects of the announcement, introduction 
and changes to HECS to be estimated separately. He found the introduction of HECS had 
arguably lowered applications from school leavers (but not mature-aged applicants). However, 
he estimated that the 1996 changes had no impact on applications from school leavers, but may 
have had a negative impact on mature age applications. 
More recent analysis of similar data in Aungles, Buchanan, Karmel and MacLachlan (2002) 
used application numbers, rather than ratios, and in contrast found no effect on school leaver 
applications following the introduction of HECS. After 1996, however, there was a small yet 
significant decrease (of less than 10 per cent). The decrease in applications from mature-age 
people after 1996 was somewhat higher. 
Some uncertainty remains about these results, for the following reasons. The first is that the 
analysis did not have a lot of available data. Second, in all exercises of these types potentially 
other factors are at work but their influence has not been taken into account. These could include 
student income support arrangements (Birrell et al 2000), changes in the expected benefits of 
higher education, or the indirect influence of the expansion or otherwise of the number of 
places. 
Overall, the analyses of aggregate demand effects do not provide a simple and unambiguous 
story. But it seems reasonable to conclude from the available evidence that, if HECS has 
reduced demand for university places among school leavers, the effect has been small. Its effect 
may have been more substantial with respect to mature-age applicants, for whom the return to 
university study might be expected to be smaller in general (since they have less time to earn 
higher incomes before retirement). Further, mature-aged potential students are more likely to be 
earning over the income repayment threshold already, meaning that changes to HECS have a 
more immediate potential effect. Changes in mature-aged demand cannot be properly analysed 
without taking into account this effect. 11 
 
4.2  Studies of participation by disadvantaged groups 
The second approach used to assess the impact of HECS on enrolments involves testing whether 
participation behaviour among low socioeconomic status groups changed in a way that was 
different from other groups, after either the introduction of HECS or after the changes to the 
scheme introduced from 1997. Therefore, the focus of these studies is not on the relationship 
between socioeconomic status and university participation at any point in time, but rather on 
whether the relationship changed. 
One example is Andrews (1999), who traced the share of low socioeconomic status students 
among 17 to 24 year olds who commenced higher education from 1989 to 1998, including their 
share of disciplines included in the high cost Band 3 introduced in 1997. Individuals were 
assigned the socioeconomic status score of the region where they or their family lived, based on 
the postcode of their home address. Individuals from low socioeconomic status backgrounds 
were defined as those whose home postal address was in the lowest quartile of the population, as 
determined by the value of the relevant socioeconomic status index. Andrews found that neither 
the introduction of higher and differential HECS nor the lowering of the income repayment 
threshold after 1997 affected the share of low socioeconomic status individuals among total 
higher education students. 
Aungles et al (2002) also used the local area socioeconomic averages concerning education and 
occupation, as did Andrews (1999), to explore the possibility of there being an effect on 
commencements of the relative disadvantaged from the 1997 HECS changes. In general, they 
found that the share of university commencements of students from low socioeconomic 
backgrounds did not change. However, there was apparently an effect of differential HECS on 
subject choice, with a decrease in enrolments of low socioeconomic status males in courses in 
which the HECS charge increased most. The actual numbers involved were very small (less than 
200 individuals) and these individuals were not discouraged from attending university per se, 
they simply changed their course choice. Chapman and Ryan (2005) report a similar effect in 
direction for this group using a measure of family wealth, but it was not found to be statistically 
significant. 
A major uncertainty about the analysis of Andrews and Aungles et al (2002) relates to the 
attribution to individuals of the average socioeconomic status level of the postcode of their 
home address. Western, McMillan, and Durrington (1998) present results based on a survey of 
3000 university students in Queensland that suggest such an approach is not reliable, finding 12 
 
that the correlations between individually based socioeconomic status measures and the same 
postcode based index used by Andrews are quite low. This might be consistent with there being 
an independent role for geographic area.  
The main implication of the Western et al (1998) results is that it would generally be better to 
attempt to assess the impact of the introduction of HECS on the social composition of the 
university student body by using individually based measures of socioeconomic status. Other 
studies have used individually based socioeconomic status measures in analysis of Australian 
higher education participation. Long, Carpenter, and Hayden (1999) and Marks, Fleming, Long 
and McMillan (2000) used four and five panels of longitudinal data  respectively to identify how 
education participation changed in Australia from the 1980s to the late 1990s. Long et al used 
parental education and occupation to identify differences in education participation by 
socioeconomic status, as well as an indirect wealth index constructed from responses by 
individuals to questions about the presence of material possessions in their houses. 
Long et al (1999) analysed participation in higher education by age 19, for two reasons. The first 
is that in Australia many school leavers defer university entrance for a year. The second is that 
their data are drawn from cohorts of individuals of the same age. Since the structure of 
schooling varies across Australian states, many individuals would not have had the opportunity 
to attend university until the year they were aged 19 in the data used. Long et al analysed data 
for individuals aged 19 in 1980, 1984, 1989 and 1994, interpreting loosely their third and fourth 
cohorts as pre- and post-HECS introduction cohorts. 
Long et al found that wealth has a strong positive effect on higher education participation. In 
addition, they found that differences between socioeconomic status groups widened somewhat 
in the fourth cohort compared to the third. However, they acknowledged that such a trend was 
evident in the earlier cohorts, so that it may not have been a specific HECS-related effect. 
Chapman (1997a) analysed university participation among 18 year olds in the last two cohorts 
analysed by Long et al (1999) and concluded that the introduction of HECS had not affected 
university participation by students from disadvantaged backgrounds. Chapman’s approach had 
the advantage of measuring university participation in 1988 for the third cohort, prior to the 
introduction of HECS. However, not everyone aged eighteen in these data had completed school 
when surveyed in the relevant years, so the estimates understated university participation among 
young Australians. 13 
 
The measure of participation used by Marks et al (2000) for the additional cohort they analysed 
differed from that used for the earlier cohorts by Long et al (1999). It was the proportion of 
individuals in higher education in 1999 that had been in Year 9 in 1995. The wealth measure 
used by Marks et al (2000) for the last panel also differed from the earlier ones. This research 
confirmed the positive impact of wealth on higher education participation. However, in general, 
their results suggested that socioeconomic status was less important in determining higher 
education participation in the 1999 data than had been the case in the earlier panels. 
Marks and McMillan (2006) analyse university participation within ranges of the entrance 
scores used by universities to select students for undergraduate courses in 1999. They find that 
within these entrance score ranges, individuals whose parental occupational backgrounds are 
‘blue’ collar are as likely to participate in university as those whose parental occupational 
backgrounds was professional. They conclude that since occupational origins have little 
influence on university participation once entrance scores are taken into account, HECS has not 
deterred students from less privileged backgrounds from attending university. 
Cardak and Ryan (2006) produced similar results. They found that students from the most 
disadvantaged social backgrounds entered university at similar rates to those from the most 
advantaged backgrounds who had the same university entrance scores as them. Their university 
participation rates were much lower than those from the most advantaged backgrounds because 
they were less likely to obtain an enter score and obtained a much lower one on average where 
they did. Among students with the same levels of school achievement in year 9, those from 
more advantaged backgrounds were able to convert that achievement into substantially higher 
university entrance scores by the end of their schooling than otherwise similar students from 
poorer backgrounds.  
Chapman and Ryan (2005) analyse the access effects of HECS using three of the longitudinal 
panels of data used in the Long et al (1999) and Marks et al (2000) studies. They use a 
consistent definition of university participation across these three cohorts. Chapman and Ryan 
(2005) analyse the participation in higher education of 18 year olds in the first year they could 
potentially attend university. Thus for the first two cohorts they estimated the participation in 
higher education in 1988 and 1993 of individuals who should have reached Year 12 in 1987 and 
1992 respectively. For the 1999 cohort analysed in Marks  et al  (2000), Chapman and Ryan 
analysed higher education participation among 18 year olds. 14 
 
Chapman and Ryan concluded that the introduction of HECS did not affect the access of the 
disadvantaged, in terms of enrolments. They found that the socioeconomic composition of the 
higher education student body changed somewhat between 1988 and 1993 in Australia, with the 
main change being the relative increase in participation by individuals in the middle of the 
wealth distribution. 
In the period after significant modifications to HECS all socioeconomic groups experienced the 
same proportionate increases in participation. Further, while there was an across-the-board 
decrease in the intentions of secondary students concerning university participation in 1996 after 
the announcement of the changes, in the next year (for all socioeconomic groups) enrolment 
intentions rebounded to their previous levels. Finally, for those who had not intended to 
participate in university, no differences associated with socioeconomic background were found 
in the proportion that eventually did participate. 
More generally, Chapman and Ryan (2005) concluded that changes in overall university 
participation appeared to reflect different behaviour across genders rather than across 
socioeconomic groups, with the exception that growth was highest among the middle of the 
wealth distribution. 
The conclusions from the Australian research with respect to socioeconomic mix and access are 
as follows. 
(i)  The relatively disadvantaged in Australia were less likely to attend university even when 
there were no student fees. This provides further support for the view that a no-charge 
public university system (that is, financed by all taxpayers) is regressive; 
(ii)  The introduction of HECS was associated with aggregate increases in higher education 
enrolments; 
(iii)  HECS did not result in decreases in the participation of prospective students from 
relatively poor families, although the percentage point increases were higher for less 
disadvantaged students, especially in the middle of the wealth distribution; 
(iv)  There was a small decrease in the aggregate number of applications after the 1997 
changes, but no apparent decreases in commencements of members of low socioeconomic 
groups, except perhaps for a small number of males into courses with the highest charges; 
and 15 
 
(v)  The significant changes to HECS introduced in 1997 were associated generally with 
increases in the participation of individuals to 1999, irrespective of their family wealth. 
Even so, the growth in participation has slowed since then. 
5.  DOES VET PAY? 
In this section we employ the concept of the internal rate of return (IRR) in order to measure 
the rewards from VET-level qualifications and establish a metric by which to assess the impact 
of an income contingent loan on VET, which is examined in the following section. The choice 
of a financial measure was guided by both theoretical and practical considerations. While many 
factors may impact upon an individual’s education decision, post-graduate remuneration and 
probability of employment are likely to figure prominently for most. And while education 
confers a range of other individual benefits, these benefits are generally more difficult to 
quantify. The methodology used to estimate rates of return to education is well developed and 
widely used, and involves the comparison of the stream of incremental future income associated 
with education with its costs. The IRR is the discount rate that equates these aggregates. 
This section proceeds as follows. After first introducing the dataset, we derive earnings profiles 
from standard wage regressions. Together with a few simplifying assumptions about costs, we 
are then able to estimate IRRs for various VET-level qualifications. As an extension, we repeat 
this process using quantile regression techniques to provide a distributional dimension to the 
analysis. 
5.1  Data 
The dataset for this study is a pooled cross-section from the first three waves of the Household 
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey.
4  HILDA is a longitudinal survey 
of Australian households funded by the Commonwealth Government and administered by the 
Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research. It contains a wealth of 
information across a range of economic, financial and social variables, and, as such, is ideally 
suited to asking questions about the returns to education. 
                                              
4  The analysis for the paper was substantially undertaken in the second half of 2005, when only three waves 
were available, for 2001, 2002 and 2003. Fourth and fifth waves, covering 2004 and 2005, were released in 
January 2006 and January 2007. 16 
 
The analysis is restricted to individuals aged between 15 and 64, so as to capture individuals 
during their primary working years. In addition, to preserve the generality of our results, we 
exclude individuals whose education-earnings dynamics are thought to be significantly different 
from the population at large. These include individuals not in full-time employment (that is, 
part-time workers, the unemployed and those not in the labour force), self-employed workers, 
those not born in Australia, and indigenous Australians. 
Summary statistics for variables used in our analysis are listed separately for men and women in 
Table 3. There are 6187 male and 3766 female observations in the estimation sample. In 2004 
dollars men earn an average $1052 per week and work around 45 hours while women earn an 
average of $850 working almost 42 hours per week. 
Education is divided into nine binary (1,0) dummy variables representing the highest 
qualification attained. The variable capturing those that did not complete high school is omitted 
in the estimations, and becomes the base for comparisons. The distribution of educational 
qualifications is broadly as expected with  31 per cent  of  men  reporting no post-school 
qualifications, 47 per cent reporting vocational qualifications and the remainder (22 per cent) 
reporting a university degree or higher. For women, the numbers are 32, 35 and 33 per cent. 
Finally, a measure of time in paid work derived in the HILDA survey is used to proxy 
experience. On average, men have around 19.5 years of work experience while women have 
around 16.5 years. 
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Table 3: Variable definitions and summary statistics 
Variable Definition
mean std dev mean std dev
Dependent variable
WageL o g of gross weekly wage from main job, in 2004  6.83 0.51 6.65 0.44
Gross weekly wage in 2004 dollars $1,052 $568 $850 $397
Educational variables
Higher degree Dummy, = 1 if highest qual is a higher degree 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19
Postgraduate diploma Dummy, = 1 if highest qual is a post-graduate 0.05 0.21 0.09 0.28
Degree Dummy, = 1 if highest qual is a degree 0.14 0.34 0.21 0.41
Diploma Dummy, = 1 if highest qual is a diploma or an  0.09 0.28 0.11 0.32
Certificate III/IV Dummy, = 1 if highest qual is a Certificate III or  0.31 0.46 0.13 0.33
Certificate I/II Dummy, = 1 if highest qual is a Certificate I or II 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.25
Certificate (level unknown) Dummy, = 1 if highest qual is a Certificate of  0.03 0.17 0.04 0.21
Completed school Dummy, = 1 if highest qual is Year 12 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.33
Incompleted school Dummy, = 1 if did not complete school 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39
Other variables
Experience Time in paid work in years 19.50 11.47 16.70 10.48




5.2  Earnings functions 
The first stage of our approach involves the use of wage equations to describe the impact of 
educational qualifications on earnings. We estimate a standard wage equation of the following 
form: 
it it it X w ε β + =
' ln  
where  N i ,..., 1 =  represents the number of individuals at each wave and  3 ,..., 1 = t  is the number 
of waves.  it X  is a vector of characteristics that influence wages, including education, estimated 
experience  and hours worked. Following Ryan (2002), we also allow experience effects to 
differ by level of (post-school) education by interacting university and VET-level qualifications 
with experience. Higher order terms are included for experience, hours and 
education-experience interaction terms to allow these effects to be non-linear.
5  
The parsimony of the specification is a feature of our approach, and is intended to capture the 
full educational qualification effect that would otherwise be diluted by a range of control 
variables. For example, wage equations typically include controls for occupation and other job 
characteristics, thereby removing from the educational qualification effect an important private 
                                              
5  Note that higher order terms are scaled so that a reasonable number of informative digits can be seen within 
the fields of the table. 18 
 
benefit of education — that is, enhanced access to a range of occupations. By excluding such 
controls from the specification, the educational qualification effects will include that component 
that reflects the improved occupational distribution available to graduates compared with 
non-graduates. 
The intellectual pedigree of this framework is well established, with roots in Mincer’s (1974) 
human capital earnings function, where individual earnings are a function of education. 
However, there remains considerable debate in the literature about the precision of estimates 
from a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. First, if unobserved factors such as 
motivation or inherent ability affect both earnings and the amount of education an individual 
acquires, then OLS estimates of the return to education will be biased. A significant literature 
has evolved over the years in an attempt to control for this ‘ability bias’ and this is now 
considered briefly. 
Ashenfelter, Harmon and Oosterbeek (1999) classify the literature into three broad strands: one 
approach attempts to control for ability bias by including measures that proxy for unobserved 
ability, such as IQ tests (Griliches and Mason 1972; Griliches 1977); a second studies the 
education and earnings outcomes of twins on the presumption that twins have equal inherent 
ability (Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994; Miller, Mulvey and Martin 1995); and a third approach 
employs the instrumental variables technique which requires instruments that are correlated with 
education but not with the earnings residual (Angrist and Krueger 1991). Card (1999), in his 
survey of the literature concludes ‘that the average return to education is not much below the 
estimate that emerges from a standard human capital earnings function fit by OLS.’  This may 
be because measurement error tends to cancel out the ability bias, suggesting that the OLS 
estimate will be close to the true estimate Griliches (1977). 
A second reason why post-course wage differentials might be a poor guide to the ‘pure’ 
qualification effect on wages is that that wage-experience profiles estimated from data collected 
at one point in time, like that used in this analysis, may not provide an accurate representation of 
the experience of cohorts as they age. However, Chia (1991) found that while estimates of the 
return to a university degree based on cross-sectional Australian data to the mid-1980s indicated 
that the return had fallen over time, cohorts of recent graduates enjoyed similar wage advantages 
over their less educated peers as had their predecessors. The analysis of the experience of 
graduate cohorts therefore pointed to no deterioration in their position relative to their peers. 19 
 
More recently, Borland and Kennedy (1998) found that age-earnings profiles were stable in 
Australia over the 1980s and 1990s. 
As such, we proceed on the basis that wage-experience profiles will provide robust rate of return 
estimates with any biases as a result of unobserved ability or the use of cross-sectional data 
likely to be small. The results of wage regressions for both men and women are reported in full 
in Table  A1 in the Appendix, with more readily interpreted transformations of selected 
coefficients presented below in Table 4. 
As expected, wages are increasing in education. For example, a male who has completed school 
earns around 27 per cent more than one that has not completed school, a male whose highest 
qualification is a diploma earns 47 per cent more, and a bachelors degree holder over 80 per cent 
more. Similarly for women, a school graduate earns 17 per cent more than an individual that 
does not complete school, while diploma and degree graduates earn 50 and 122 per cent more, 
respectively. Interestingly, women with post-school qualifications earn a higher wage premium 
(relative to women that did not complete school) than their male counterparts. For example, 
women with a post-graduate degree could expect to earn 150 per cent more than those without a 
high school certificate, while the corresponding premium for men is 106 per cent. This likely 
reflects diminished earnings prospects for women who do not complete school relative to their 
male counterparts. 
Consistent with theory, the results also point to diminishing returns to experience. For example, 
a male VET graduate can expect a double-digit increase in wages for his first year of work 
experience, a 7 per cent increase for his fifth, and less than a ½ of one per cent increase as he 
gains his twentieth year of experience. Diminishing returns to experience are evident for both 
sexes irrespective of educational level, although the initial returns to experience are somewhat 
lower for female VET and school graduates than their male counterparts. 
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Table 4: Interpretive statistics from first stage wage regressions 
Male Female
Educational attainment
Higher degree 106 150
Postgraduate diploma 93 138
Degree 83 122
Diploma 47 50
Certificate III/IV 27 29
Certificate I/II 7 32
Certificate (level unknown) 16 38
Completed school 27 17
Experience
University
1 year 10.9 12.8
3 years 8.5 9.6
5 years 6.4 7.0
10 years 2.9 2.6
20 years 0.4 -0.1
VET
1 year 11.8 3.4
3 years 9.1 3.0
5 years 6.9 2.6
10 years 3.0 1.7
20 years 0.2 0.4
Other
1 year 14.1 8.8
3 years 10.7 6.8
5 years 7.9 5.1
10 years 3.1 2.2
20 years 0.1 0.0
(% difference in wages relative to individuals that did not complete school)
(% change in wages for a marginal increase in experience at selected levels of experience)
 
 
From these results we are able to construct age-earnings profiles that can be used to derive the 
incremental income from attaining a particular level of education, and these are now shown in 
Figure 1. The profiles assume a full working life of 47 years, from age 18 to 65. For those 
undertaking post-school study, this is reduced by the amount of time it takes to complete that 
study. In this exercise we assume that a basic vocational certificate (I or II) takes 6 months to 
complete, a skilled vocational certificate (III or IV) one year, associate diplomas one and a half 
years, and a diploma, two years. 21 
 
Figure 1: Selected age-earnings profiles 
Annual earnings 2004 


































The earnings profiles trace out the expected pattern of a steep increase in real earnings in the 
first part of an individual’s working life, increasing more gently in the middle part, before 
plateauing towards the end.
6  The dip in the profiles from ages 60 to 65, which is particularly 
pronounced for those without post-school qualifications, is confirmed in the raw data (see 
Appendix Figure A1). More broadly, the profiles given by the raw data are relatively close to 
that generated from our wage regressions, confirming somewhat the appropriateness of our 
specification. As expected, the profiles for men are higher at all levels of educational attainment, 
particularly for post school qualifications.  
5.3  Internal rates of return 
As mentioned earlier, the standard analytical tool used to estimate private rates of return to 
education is the IRR, the discount rate that equates the benefits from a given level of education 
with the costs of obtaining the qualification.
7  In this framework the benefit from study is the 
post-course wage differential between graduates and a selected comparison group, while the 
costs are forgone earnings during the period of study and the course fees.
8  
It is clear at this point that identifying an appropriate comparison group for a each level of VET 
qualification is critical to calculations of both post-course wage differentials and forgone 
income. The objective is to find the group that would most closely reflect the earnings capacity 
of an individual if they did not undertake the course of study in question. In what follows 
comparisons are made between diploma graduates and individuals who have completed school 
(but without any post-school qualifications) while individuals with a Certificate  III or IV 
qualification are compared with those who did not complete their schooling. These judgments 
are made on the basis that completion of Year 12 or Year 10 in conjunction with a related 
certificate course are common pre-requisites for entry into diploma courses. In contrast, 
completion of high school is often not a prerequisite for skilled vocational qualifications (even 
                                              
6  Note that these profiles are shown in cross-section here. Income profiles used in calculations of IRRs and 
repayment paths under an income contingent loan are adjusted for growth in Average Weekly Earnings 
(which is assumed to be 4 per cent per annum). The implications of this are discussed in section 6.1. 
7  It is worth noting that the IRR provides an estimate of the return to education given the amount invested. 
That the IRR from some qualification exceeds that of another does not imply that it produces a higher 
lifetime income stream — the costs of obtaining it may be lower. 
8  Since both the stream of benefits and costs are discounted, greatest weight in the calculation of the IRR is 
given to immediate costs and benefits of the education and training. 23 
 
though many young people now enter skilled vocational qualifications having completed their 
schooling). 
In addition to identifying an appropriate comparison group, the calculation of forgone income 
also relies heavily upon related assumptions about the mode of study and level of income 
support. Using data from the 1997 TAFE graduate destination survey, Ryan (2002) found that 
skilled vocational graduates were more likely than other graduates to be working during their 
courses, and about a third of them were employed before, during, and after their courses by the 
same employer. He concludes that, for many graduates, forgone income from undertaking their 
course is likely to have been minimal. 
Notwithstanding the above, for simplicity we assume that all post-school qualifications are 
undertaken on a full-time basis so that students do not draw an income from employment during 
the period of study. All other things being equal, this will result in an overestimate of forgone 
income, and therefore, an underestimate of the IRR for some students. However, we expect this 
effect will be ameliorated by the inclusion of income support in the calculation. The income 
support rate is assumed to be $8500 per annum (applied on a pro-rata basis for part year study), 
based on the ‘18 and over, away from home’ rate of Youth Allowance. 
Finally we must also make some assumptions about the direct costs of courses. VET course 
costs vary substantially between course types, level, jurisdictions, provider types and 
institutions. In addition, concessional rates typically apply to individuals in receipt of social 
security payments such as the Youth Allowance. On the basis of an internet search of the fees 
charged by institutions and estimates in Borthwick (1999), fees for full-time, full-year students 
who pay full course costs appear to lie between $500 and $1500  per  annum in 2005.
9 For 
completeness, we provide IRR estimates assuming course costs of $500, $1000 and 
$1500 per annum. 
Estimates of the IRR for selected VET qualifications are presented in Table 5, and in general 
they appear to be high. A one-year Certificate III or IV qualification returns significantly in 
excess of more advanced VET qualifications because the investment (forgone income) is less: 
the course is shorter in duration and the chosen comparison group (individuals who did not 
complete school) have a significantly lower earnings profile than the corresponding reference 
                                              
9   This is consistent with the levels reported in Watson (2003). 24 
 
group for diploma students (individuals who did complete school). In other words, the bar is set 
at a lower point on the education hierarchy. Even so, our results suggest the financial return is 
still very healthy for more advanced VET courses, with associate diplomas/diplomas yielding 
IRRs of between 7 and 10 per cent for men, and between 10 and 14 per cent for women. 
Table 5: IRRs for selected VET qualifications 
Male Female
Diploma (2 years)
Course cost = $500 per annum 7.7% 10.5%
Course cost = $1000 per annum 7.6% 10.3%
Course cost = $1500 per annum 7.5% 10.1%
Assoc diploma (1.5 years)
Course cost = $500 per annum 10.1% 14.3%
Course cost = $1000 per annum 10.0% 14.0%
Course cost = $1500 per annum 9.8% 13.6%
Certificate III/IV (1 year)
Course cost = $500 per annum 37.3% 31.8%
Course cost = $1000 per annum 35.9% 30.3%
Course cost = $1500 per annum 34.7% 28.9%  
Note: The comparison group for diploma qualifications is ‘completed school’ while comparison group for 
Certificate III/IV is ‘did not complete school’. 
 
5.4  Quantile regression analysis 
To this point, our results have been derived at the mean of the conditional wages distribution, 
which begs the question whether they are representative across the entire distribution. This 
seems particularly relevant for the question at hand, given access to education is more likely to 
be prohibitive for low income individuals, placing increased importance on understanding the 
dynamics of the educational investment decision at the tails of the distribution. Quantile 
regression, as introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) provides a means of investigating 
distributional issues. In simple terms, quantile regression provides for estimation at all points of 
the conditional wage distribution, not just at the mean as required by OLS.
10 




th percentiles of the conditional wages distribution, with full regression 
results, interpretive statistics and age-earnings profiles presented in Appendix tables A2 and A3 
and illustrated in Figure A2. For VET level educational variables there is a clear tendency for 
                                              
10  See Koenker and Hallock (2001) for an accessible description of quantile regression, or Buchinsky (1998) 
for a more comprehensive review. 25 
 
the estimated coefficient, and therefore the wage benefits, to increase along the conditional 
wages distribution.
11   For example, the coefficient on the diploma qualification for males 
increases from 0.34 at the 25
th percentile to 0.48 at the 75
th percentile, implying a wage premium 
of 41 per cent and 62 per cent respectively over otherwise similar males that did not complete 
school.
12 The pattern is similar for women, with the coefficient on VET diplomas increasing 
from 0.35 to 0.46 between the 25
th and 75
th percentiles, implying a premium of 42 per cent and 
59 per cent respectively over their counterparts that did not complete school.
13 














































th percentiles. As before, returns are higher for Certificate III/IV qualifications 
than for diploma level qualifications, and seem relatively invariant to assumptions about course 
fees. However, there is some variation in IRRs across the wages distribution. On average, the 
results for diploma qualifications indicate that returns are higher around the middle to lower part 
of the wages distribution. For example the estimated IRR for a male undertaking a 2 year 
diploma peaks at above 10 per cent at the 50
th percentile, and compares with an estimated IRR 
of around 7  per  cent at the 75
th percentile (and around 7½  per  cent from earlier mean 
regressions). 
                                              
11  Intuitively, this means that the dispersion of income for VET graduates is greater than for those that did not 
complete school. 
12   The wage premium figures differ from the coefficients because of the log transformation. 
13  Interestingly, this pattern is reversed for university level qualifications, with the estimated wage benefits 
higher at the 25
th percentile than at the75th percentile for both male and female university graduates. 26 
 
For women the contrast is even starker, with the IRR for a 2 year diploma trebling from around 
5½ per cent at the 75
th percentile to between 14 and 15 per cent.
14  Note that the pattern of IRRs 
across the income distribution for diploma qualifications may not necessarily match that implied 
by the estimated wage returns because the counterfactual reference group is different. In the case 
of the estimated parameters presented in Figure 2, wage returns increase along the income 
distribution relative to individuals that did not complete school, while in the IRR calculations 
presented in table 6, the comparison group for diploma graduates is individuals that completed 
high school. That the IRR’s for diploma graduates peak at the middle to lower end of the income 
distribution merely suggests that individuals that completed high school (and nothing higher) 
have a greater variance in incomes along the distribution that diploma graduates. 
This pattern is reversed for lower level VET qualifications, with IRRs for Certificate III/IV 
qualifications higher at the 75
th percentile than at the 25
th percentile for both men and women. 
Notwithstanding this, rates of return at the lower end of the distribution are still very healthy, at 
between 35 and 40 per cent for men and just under 20 per cent for women. 
Table 6: IRRs for selected VET-level qualifications under for different quantiles 
Male Female
Q25 Q50 Q75 Q25 Q50 Q75
Diploma (2 years)
Course cost = $500 per annum 8.2% 10.9% 7.1% 14.7% 12.4% 5.6%
Course cost = $1000 per annum 8.0% 10.8% 7.0% 14.4% 12.2% 5.5%
Course cost = $1500 per annum 7.9% 10.6% 7.0% 14.1% 12.0% 5.5%
Assoc diploma (1.5 years)
Course cost = $500 per annum 11.2% 14.8% 9.5% 20.1% 17.0% 7.4%
Course cost = $1000 per annum 10.9% 14.5% 9.4% 19.3% 16.5% 7.2%
Course cost = $1500 per annum 10.7% 14.2% 9.3% 18.7% 16.1% 7.1%
Certificate III/IV (1 year)
Course cost = $500 per annum 40.6% 43.6% 43.0% 19.9% 34.5% 48.3%
Course cost = $1000 per annum 38.4% 41.8% 41.6% 19.1% 32.6% 46.4%
Course cost = $1500 per annum 36.5% 40.2% 40.3% 18.4% 30.9% 44.6%  
Note: comparison group for diploma is ‘completed school’ while comparison group for Certificate III/IV is 
‘did not complete school’ 
 
                                              
14  Recall that earlier results from the mean of the conditional wages distribution resulted in corresponding 
IRRs of between 10 and 10.5 per cent. 27 
 
6.  INTRODUCING AN INCOME CONTINGENT LOAN TO THE VET SECTOR 
In this section we assess the implications of introducing an income contingent loan to the VET 
sector. Critically, we assume the income contingent loan will follow the template given by 
HECS: that is, the loan will be levied on an interest free basis and have the same repayment 
parameters as for HECS loans. Having already established an expected earnings stream for VET 
graduates in the previous section, it is a straightforward task to derive a loan repayment path 
under a HECS-style regime, and raises issues of the extent of a Commonwealth Government 
subsidy to VET students.  
6.1  How long will it take to repay? 
Using the earnings profiles for VET graduates derived in the previous section, and applying the 
current HECS repayment parameters, we are able to derive an expected repayment path for VET 
loans under a HECS-style regime. In deriving these repayment streams we depart from the 
standard approach of assuming that the earnings stream on which repayments are based is given 
simply by the cross-sectional earnings profiles, without any adjustment for growth in average 
earnings as a result of inflation or general productivity growth in the economy. Rather, since the 
actual repayment is determined by the nominal earnings of the individual, we adjust the earnings 
profile derived in section 5.2 by growth in Average Weekly Earnings.
15 
Repayment scenarios for individuals undertaking a 2-year diploma course are shown separately 
for men and women in Figure 3. Male graduates of such a course can expect to start repaying 
their loan five years after graduation, and depending on the course cost, will repay the loan in 
full in either one or two years. Female graduates will start repaying their debt on average in their 
seventh year after graduation. Again, given the relatively low course fees, they can expect to 
have repaid the loan by their eighth year of work. 
                                              
15  This is assumed to be 4  per  cent per  annum, reflecting average inflation of 2.5  per  cent per  annum and 
productivity growth of 1.5 per cent per annum. Note that repayment thresholds are also adjusted by AWE so 
that point at which repayments are made and the rate of compulsory repayment levied remains the same 
under both approaches. 28 
 









































The time taken to repay loans is similar for shorter diploma courses and male Certificate III/IV 
courses, but increases to 12 years for female Certificate III/IV graduates. Illustrations of other 
scenarios are provided at Appendix Figure A3. 
6.2  Net present value analysis 
Since HECS is an interest free loan, the longer it takes to repay the loan, the greater is the 
subsidy, or equivalently, the cost to government of the provision of the loan due to the absence 
of a real rate of interest on the debt. Table 7 provides the net present value of total fees for 
selected VET qualifications under alternative scenarios for annual fees, under both the current 
‘up-front fee’ arrangement and a HECS-style regime. We assume a discount rate of 5 per cent, 
which is within the range that is commonly applied in this kind of analysis.
16 For  diploma 
qualifications, the subsidy appears to be of the order of 13 per cent for men and 17 per cent for 
women, the difference reflecting the marginally faster repayment stream generated by the male 
earnings profiles. The subsidies are higher for Certificate III/IV qualifications, reflecting the 
longer period required to repay the loan. In the case of men, the subsidy is around 17.5 per cent 
while for women the subsidy is a little higher at 25 per cent. 
                                              
16  The choice of discount rate is somewhat arbitrary, and a slightly higher rate could be equally justified. A 
higher rate would, of course, result in larger estimated subsidies from an income contingent loan. 29 
 
Table 7: NPV of VET qualifications under an ICL 
Up-front 
NPV Male Female Male Female
Diploma (2 years)
Course cost = $500 pa 1,000 976 855 12.4 16.6
Course cost = $1000 pa 2,000 1,952 1,701 12.9 16.9
Course cost = $1500 pa 3,000 2,929 2,536 13.4 17.4
Assoc diploma (1.5 years)
Course cost = $500 pa 1,000 976 855 12.4 14.5
Course cost = $1000 pa 2,000 1,952 1,703 12.8 14.9
Course cost = $1500 pa 3,000 2,929 2,537 13.4 15.4
Certificate III/IV (1 year)
Course cost = $500 pa 500 500 412 17.5 25.1
Course cost = $1000 pa 1,000 1,000 825 17.5 25.1
Course cost = $1500 pa 1,500 1,500 1,237 17.5 25.1













To cast a different light on the magnitude of the subsidy, we ask ‘what up-front fee would give 
the same net present value as under the case with an income contingent loan?’  The answers are 
provided in Table 8. In all cases the annual up-front charge would be lower under this example 
of an income contingent loan. For example, a 2-year diploma which currently costs 
$1500 per annum would on average cost $1299 for men and $1239 for women if the charges 
were calibrated to provide the same net present value as under an income contingent charge. 
Similarly, the cost of a 1.5-year associate diploma course could be reduced from 
$1000 per annum to $834 per annum for men and $794 per annum for women if students were 
to receive the same NPV as with a HECS-style loan arrangement. 
Table 8: Course fees that provide the same NPV as under an ICL 
Male Female
Diploma (2 years)
Current up-front course cost = $500 per annum 438 417
Current up-front course cost = $1000 per annum 871 831
Current up-front course cost = $1500 per annum 1,299 1,239
Assoc diploma (1.5 years)
Current up-front course cost = $500 per annum 438 427
Current up-front course cost = $1000 per annum 872 851
Current up-front course cost = $1500 per annum 1,299 1,268
Certificate III/IV (1 year)
Current up-front course cost = $500 per annum 412 374
Current up-front course cost = $1000 per annum 825 749
Current up-front course cost = $1500 per annum 1,237 1,123




Alternatively, the subsidy could be used to increase funds to the VET sector without increasing 
the burden on students (in terms of NPV). Table 9 shows the maximum level that fees could be 
increased to without reducing the benefit (in terms of NPV) that VET students currently receive 
from their courses. For example, the annual fee for a 2-year diploma could be increased from 
$1500 per annum to $1732 per annum for men and $1817 per annum for women following the 
introduction of an ICL, without making students financially worse off. And the cost of a 
Certificate III/IV course currently costing $1000 could be increased to $1213 for men and $1335 
for women under an ICL without reducing the NPV of current course fees. 
Table 9: Course fees under an ICL that give the same NPV as under current ‘up-front’ 
fees 
Course fee under HECS that yields the same NPV as 
under current 'up-front' regime
Male Female
Diploma (2 years)
Current up-front course cost = $500 per annum
Current up-front course cost = $1000 per annum
Current up-front course cost = $1500 per annum
Assoc diploma (1.5 years)
Current up-front course cost = $500 per annum
Current up-front course cost = $1000 per annum
Current up-front course cost = $1500 per annum
Certificate III/IV (1 year)
Current up-front course cost = $500 per annum
Current up-front course cost = $1000 per annum




















It is worth noting that while the subsidy provided by an interest free ICL is significant in terms 
of individual course costs, it has very little impact on IRR’s (See Attachment Table A4). While 
IRRs to VET qualifications are larger under ICL, the difference is marginal since the direct 
effect on course costs are dwarfed by the incremental income effect in the IRR calculation. 
7.  TOWARDS AN CONTINGENT LOAN FOR VET 
In 2005 the Commonwealth government introduced a significant reform to HECS, known as 
‘FEE-HELP’. FEE-HELP is an important innovation in Australian higher education financing 
and could be used to introduce an income contingent charging mechanism in TAFE. FEE-HELP 
works approximately as follows. 31 
 
Students wanting to enrol in higher education courses with charges not covered by HECS (such 
as for full-fee paying undergraduates or graduate courses) can have the costs at the point of 
entry met by the Commonwealth government. In return the student commits to paying the 
charge through the HECS arrangements, and their debts are recorded in the Australian Tax 
Office in exactly the same way as if the debt was a HECS debt. In fact, FEE-HELP can be 
described fairly accurately as HECS with higher charges. 
An interesting development is that the FEE-HELP facility has now become available to private 
universities, such as Bond, and some private training providers, such as religious training 
institutions. Recently the Australian Council of Private Education and Training (ACPET) has 
called for FEE-HELP to be made available to the students of all private tertiary education 
institutions. If and when this happens, TAFE will be sitting in a very strange place, as the only 
remaining area of Australian post-compulsory education without access to an income contingent 
loan. This could mean that eventually TAFE would be crowded out by private sector alternatives 
and cease to be viable as an educational institution. 
It would be a straightforward extension of FEE-HELP to allow the loan scheme to be used for 
TAFE Diplomas and Associate Diplomas. It would work as follows. A TAFE institution would 
set a fee for a course, as now happens, and the Commonwealth government would offer 
prospective students access to a FEE-HELP loan. If this is taken up by the student the 
Commonwealth government pays the TAFE (or the State government) the fee, and the student 
repays the debt through the HECS system. Just as with HECS there would be no need for there 
to be individual accounts, because since the initial outlay is provided through the 
Commonwealth it is sensible that the Commonwealth government is repaid the debt through the 
Tax Office. What happens to the loan repayments then is a matter for the Commonwealth 
government.
17 
A final issue for policy is that while the use of the Australian Tax Office for the collection of an 
income contingent debt is necessary, to do so with respect to TAFE in particular raises some 
issues concerning Federal and States/Territories jurisdiction. The Commonwealth Government 
has traditionally not been directly involved in TAFE and it would need to be satisfied that the 
                                              
17   If FEE-HELP is used instead of a straight application of HECS, the subsidies associated with a zero real 
interest rate are reduced significantly, since the use of the FEE-HELP facility imposes a 20  per  cent 
surcharge on the debt. 32 
 
risks associated with, for example, the level of fees being raised, have been fully thought 
through. 
8.  CONCLUSION 
It has been argued in this paper that the student financing arrangements for VET, and TAFE 
specifically, sit uneasily with both economic theory and current Australian and many other 
countries’ practice. In particular, it is well recognised that because of the incapacity of capital 
markets to solve problems of credit constraints for prospective students government intervention 
in the form of the underwriting or provision of loans is required, but no such intervention exists 
for VET students. 
It has been argued further that loans taking the form with income contingent collection, such as 
with the case of HECS, are the most appropriate government financing instrument for all tertiary 
education. We summarised the evidence with respect to the effects of HECS on a range of 
outcomes, such as aggregate demand for, and rates of return to, higher education, and 
concerning the implications of the system for the access of poor prospective students. It seems 
clear that the introduction of, and changes to HECS, have had little discernible effects on private 
rates of return and aggregate demand for higher education. Perhaps more importantly a range of 
different studies have revealed that there are no apparent barriers to the poor from the 
introduction of and changes to HECS with respect to participation in higher education. 
Our empirical analysis is motivated by the need to establish the existence and extent of private 
rates of return to investment in VET, since if these do not exist the case for charging — no 
matter what financing arrangements are to be used — sits on weaker grounds. With the use of 
the HILDA data set we estimated a series of fairly complicated wage equations to determine the 
returns to VET qualifications, as measured by the existence of TAFE diplomas, associate 
diplomas and certificates. 
With a range of hypothetical education path counter-factuals it is apparent that the internal rates 
of return are quite healthy at the mean (that is, as estimated with OLS) for both men and women. 
For example, diplomas and associated diplomas are associated with internal rates of return of 
around 8-10 per cent per annum for men, and about 10-14 per cent per annum for women. These 
are roughly comparable to those usually estimated with respect to investments in undergraduate 
higher education degrees. Employing quantile regression techniques we have been able to 33 
 
illustrate that these rates of return differ significantly across the entire wage distribution, but 
nevertheless remain quite robust and familiar. 
We then used the regression results to illustrate the extent of implicit subsidies involved in an 
application of current HECS arrangements for the collection of a VET debt. Our approach 
involved calculations of the present value of levels of debt resulting from the imposition of 
different nominal charges for diplomas, associate diplomas and certificate TAFE courses. The 
extent of the implicit public sector financial assistance and the associated time streams of 
repayments of the debt are such as to suggest that HECS for TAFE would deliver acceptable 
levels of subsidies with respect to the budget. This part of the exercise, coupled with the 
compelling arguments for policy reform towards an income contingent loan for the sector, make 
robust the case for continuing to question the acceptability of current arrangements. 35 
 
APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES AND CHARTS 
Table A1: Regression results for OLS wage equations 
(Dependent variable is the log of full-time weekly wages) 
Male Female
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Constant 3.53 20.73 3.75 25.78
Educational attainment
Higher degree 0.72 8.92 0.91 11.70
Postgraduate diploma 0.66 8.19 0.87 11.87
Degree 0.61 7.98 0.80 11.19
Diploma 0.39 6.23 0.41 5.96
Certificate III/IV 0.24 3.93 0.26 3.91
Certificate I/II 0.07 1.13 0.28 4.09
Certificate (level unknown) 0.15 2.27 0.33 4.52
Completed school 0.24 11.72 0.16 6.92
Experience
Experience 0.14 12.15 0.13 8.65
Experience
2/100 -0.87 -8.41 -0.82 -5.61
Experience
3/1000 0.23 6.97 0.22 4.27
Experience
4/10000 -0.02 -6.27 -0.02 -3.55
Uni*Experience -0.03 -1.34 -0.09 -4.20
Uni*(Experience
2/100) 0.23 1.13 0.72 3.36
Uni*(Experience
3/1000) -0.07 -0.92 -0.21 -2.85
Uni*(Experience
4/10000) 0.01 0.71 0.02 2.51
VET*Experience -0.02 -1.29 -0.04 -1.88
VET*(Experience
2/100) 0.18 1.24 0.29 1.48
VET*(Experience
3/1000) -0.06 -1.24 -0.09 -1.28
VET*(Experience
4/10000) 0.01 1.25 0.01 1.18
Hours of work
Hours 0.10 10.83 0.09 11.37
Hours
2/100 -0.11 -7.66 -0.11 -7.90
Hours






Figure A1: Selected earnings profiles from raw data 
Panel A: Males 
Age
 Diploma  Cert_iii_iv
 Comp_schl  Incomp_schl






Panel B: Females 
Age
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Table A2: Quantile regression results for wage equations 
(Dependent variable is the log of full-time weekly wages) 
Male Female
Q25 Q50 Q75 Q25 Q50 Q75
Constant 2.82 ** 3.55 ** 4.14 ** 3.06 ** 3.49 ** 4.14 **
Educational attainment
Higher degree 0.93 ** 0.80 ** 0.56 ** 0.86 ** 0.89 ** 0.81 **
Postgraduate diploma 0.83 ** 0.72 ** 0.51 ** 0.80 ** 0.83 ** 0.71 **
Degree 0.78 ** 0.71 ** 0.52 ** 0.72 ** 0.78 ** 0.69 **
D i p l o m a 0 . 3 4* * 0 . 4 3* * 0 . 4 8* * 0 . 3 5* * 0 . 4 4* * 0 . 4 6* *
Certificate III/IV 0.19 ** 0.26 ** 0.33 ** 0.20 ** 0.28 ** 0.34 **
Certificate I/II 0.06 0.12 * 0.18 * 0.22 ** 0.29 ** 0.30 **
Certificate (level unknown) 0.08 0.21 ** 0.26 ** 0.27 ** 0.33 ** 0.38 **
Completed school 0.23 ** 0.24 ** 0.24 ** 0.10 ** 0.15 ** 0.21 **
Experience
E x p e r i e n c e 0 . 1 4* * 0 . 1 3* * 0 . 1 2* * 0 . 1 4* * 0 . 1 3* * 0 . 1 1* *
Experience
2/100 -0.84 ** -0.78 ** -0.75 ** -0.97 ** -0.80 ** -0.62 *
Experience
3/1000 0.21 ** 0.21 ** 0.21 ** 0.28 ** 0.22 ** 0.16
Experience
4/10000 -0.02 ** -0.02 ** -0.02 ** -0.03 ** -0.02 ** -0.02
Uni*Experience -0.08 ** -0.05 0.00 -0.08 ** -0.09 ** -0.05
Uni*(Experience
2/100) 0.53 * 0.38 0.02 0.62 ** 0.67 ** 0.33
Uni*(Experience
3/1000) -0.14 -0.12 -0.02 -0.18 * -0.20 * -0.10
Uni*(Experience
4/10000) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 * 0.01
VET*Experience 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 * -0.05
VET*(Experience
2/100) 0.03 0.12 0.39 0.37 0.29 0.29
VET*(Experience
3/1000) -0.01 -0.03 -0.12 -0.13 -0.07 -0.08
VET*(Experience
4/10000) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Hours of work
H o u r s 0 . 1 2* * 0 . 0 9* * 0 . 0 7* * 0 . 1 2* * 0 . 1 1* * 0 . 0 8* *
Hours
2/100 -0.16 ** -0.11 ** -0.08 ** -0.16 ** -0.15 ** -0.09
Hours
3/1000 0.01 ** 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 0.01 ** 0.01 ** 0.00
Observations
Pseudo R
2 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.28
5998 3570
 
* denotes statistical significance at the 5 per cent level. 
** denotes statistical significance at the 1 per cent level. 38 
 
Table A3: Interpretive statistics from quantile regressions 
Male Female
Q25 Q50 Q75 Q25 Q50 Q75
Educational attainment
(% difference in wages relative to individuals that did not complete school)
Higher degree 153 122 75 137 144 124
Postgraduate diploma 130 106 66 123 130 103
Degree 118 104 68 105 119 100
Diploma 41 54 62 42 55 59
Certificate III/IV 21 29 39 22 33 41
Certificate I/II 7 13 20 25 34 35
Certificate (level unknown) 8 24 29 31 40 46
Completed school 25 27 28 10 16 23
Experience
(% change in wages for a marginal increase in experience at selected levels of experience)
University
1 year 6.6 8.1 12.7 5.3 3.6 5.6
3 years 5.4 6.6 9.8 4.0 3.1 4.5
5 years 4.4 5.3 7.4 3.0 2.7 3.6
10 years 2.6 2.8 3.2 1.4 1.7 1.9
20 years 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.3
VET
1 year 14.3 13.0 12.3 9.5 7.9 6.1
3 years 11.0 10.0 9.3 7.2 6.0 4.9
5 years 8.2 7.5 6.9 5.3 4.5 3.9
10 years 3.5 3.2 2.9 2.1 1.8 2.0
20 years 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.5
No post-school qualifications
1 year 13.9 11.1 7.4 13.7 12.5 10.8
3 years 10.6 8.5 6.0 9.9 9.4 8.4
5 years 8.0 6.4 4.8 6.9 6.9 6.4
10 years 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.1 2.6 2.9





Figure A2: Selected age-earnings profiles from quantile regressions 
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Figure A3: Expected ICL repayment paths for selected VET qualifications 
















































































* Debt is never repaid as income never rises above prescribed threshold  
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Table A4: IRRs for selected VET qualifications under alternative funding regimes 
Male Female
No HECS HECS No HECS HECS
Diploma (2 years)
Course cost = $500 per annum 7.7% 7.7% 10.5% 10.5%
Course cost = $1000 per annum 7.6% 7.6% 10.3% 10.4%
Course cost = $1500 per annum 7.5% 7.6% 10.1% 10.3%
Assoc diploma (1.5 years)
Course cost = $500 per annum 10.1% 10.2% 14.3% 14.6%
Course cost = $1000 per annum 10.0% 10.1% 14.0% 14.4%
Course cost = $1500 per annum 9.8% 10.0% 13.6% 14.2%
Certificate III/IV (1 year)
Course cost = $500 per annum 37.3% 38.7% 31.8% 33.5%
Course cost = $1000 per annum 35.9% 38.6% 30.3% 33.4%




Andrews, L 1997, The Effect of HECS on Interest in Undertaking Higher Education, Higher 
Education Division, Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs, 
AGPS, Canberra. 
Andrews, L 1999, ‘The effect of HECS on access’, Research Report, Department of Education, 
Employment, Training and Youth Affairs, Canberra. 
Angrist, J and Krueger, A 1991, ‘Does compulsory schooling attendance affect schooling and 
earnings’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106: 979-1014. 
Ashenfelter, O, Harmon, C and Oosterbeek, H 1999, ‘A review of estimates of the 
schooling/earnings relationship, with tests for publication bias’, Labour Economics, 6: 453-470. 
Ashenfelter, O and Krueger, A 1994, ‘Estimates of the economic return to schooling for a new 
sample of twins’, American Economic Review, 84: 1157-73. 
Aungles, P, Buchanan, I, Karmel, T and MacLachlan, M 2002, HECS and opportunities in 
higher education, Research, Analysis and Evaluation Group, Commonwealth Department of 
Education, Science and Training, Canberra. 
Birrell, R, Calderon, A, Dobson, I and Smith, T 2000, ‘Equity in access to higher education 
revisited’, People and Place, 8 (1), 50–61. 
Borland, J 2001, ‘New estimates of the private rate of return to university education in 
Australia’, mimeo, Department of Economics, University of Melbourne. 
Borland, J and Kennedy, S 1998, ‘Earnings inequality in Australia in the 1980s and 1990s’, 
Discussion Paper No. 389, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Australian National 
University. 
Borthwick, S 1999, ‘Overview of Student Costs and Government Funding in Post-compulsory 
Educaiton and Training’, Research and Evaluation Branch Report 4/99, Department of 
Education, Training and Youth Affairs, Canberra. 
Buchinsky, M 1998, ‘Recent Advances in Quantile Regression Models: A Practical Guideline  
43 
for Empirical Research’, The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 33, pp 88-126. 
Card, D 1999, ‘The causal effect of education on earnings’, in Ashenfelter, O and Card, D, 
editors, Handbook of Labour Economics Volume 3, Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
Cardak, B and Ryan, C 2006, Why are high ability individuals from poor backgrounds under-
represented at university?, La Trobe School of Business Discussion Paper A06.04, Melbourne. 
Chapman, B, 2006  Government Managing Risk: Income contingent loans for social and 
economic progress, Routledge, London. 
Chapman, B 1997, ‘Conceptual issues and the Australian experience with income contingent 
charging for higher education’, The Economic Journal, Vol. 107 (42), pp 1178–1193. 
Chapman, B and Ryan, C 2005, ‘The Access Implications of Income Related Charges for 
Higher Education: Lessons from Australia’, Economics of Education Review, 24 (5): 491-512. 
 
Chapman, B and Ryan, C 2002, ‘Income Contingent Financing of Student Charges for Higher 
Education: Assessing the Australian Innovation’, Welsh Journal of Education, 11 (1): 45-63. 
Chapman, B and Salvage, T 1997 ‘Changes in Costs for Australian Higher Education Students 
from the 1996/97 Budget’, in Sharpham, J and Harman, G (eds), Future Australian Universities, 
University of New England Press: 49-74. 
Chia, TT 1990, ‘Returns to Higher Education in Australia’, PhD thesis, Economics Program, 
Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra. 
Griliches, Z 1977, ‘Estimating the return to schooling: some econometric problems’, 
Econometrica, 45: 1-22. 
Griliches, Z and Mason, W 1972, ‘Education, income and ability’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 80 (2): 74-103. 
Harrison, M 1995, ‘Default in guaranteed student loan programs’, Journal of Student Financial 
Aid, 25: 25–42. 
Koenker, R and Bassett, G 1978, ‘Regression Quantiles’, Econometrica, Vol. 46, pp 33-50.  
44 
Koenker, R and Hallock, K 2001, ‘Quantile Regression,’ Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15 
(4): 143-156. 
Long, M, Carpenter, P and Hayden, M 1999, ‘Participation in Education and Training: 1980–
1994’, Longitudinal Surveys of Australian Youth Research Report No. 13, Melbourne: 
Australian Council for Educational Research. 
Marks, GN and McMillan, J forthcoming 2007, ‘Australia: Changes in Socioeconomic 
Inequalities in University Participation’, in Shavit, Y, Arum, R and Gamoran, A editors, 
Stratification in Higher Education: A Comparative Study, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Marks, GN, Fleming, N, Long, M and McMillan, J 2000, ‘Patterns of participation in year 12 
and higher education in Australia: trends and issues’, Longitudinal Surveys of Australian Youth 
Research Report No 17, Melbourne: ACER. 
Miller, P, Mulvey, C and Martin, N 1995, ‘What do Twins Studies Reveal About the Economic 
Returns to Education? A Comparison of Australian and U.S. Findings’, American Economic 
Review 85: 586-599. 
Mincer, J 1974, Schooling, experience and earnings, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
New York. 
National Centre for Vocational Education Research (NCVER) 2004, ‘Australian vocational 
education and training statistics: students and courses 2003’, available at 
http://www.ncver.edu.au/statistics/vet/ann03/id03/idall03.pdf. 
Ryan, C 2002, Individual returns to vocational education and training qualifications: their 
implications for lifelong learning, National Centre for Vocational Education Research, South 
Australia. 
Western, J, McMillan, J and Durrington, D 1998, ‘Differential access to higher education: the 
measurement of socioeconomic status, rurality and isolation’, Evaluations and Investigations 
Program 98/14, Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs. 
Watson, L 2003, ‘What do TAFE students pay? A review of charging policies in Australian 
vocational education and training’, available at http://www.ncver.edu.au/publications/1391.html. 